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The Welfare Costs of Hybrid Carbon Policies in the European Union
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Abstract
To what extent do the welfare costs associated with the implementation of the Burden Sharing Agreement in the
European Union depend on sectoral allocation of emissions rights? What are the prospects for strategic climate
policy to favor domestic production? This paper attempts to answer those questions using a CGE model
featuring a detailed representation of the European economies. First, numerical simulations show that equalizing
marginal abatement costs across domestic sectors greatly reduces the burden of the emissions constraint but also
that other allocations may be preferable for some countries because of pre-existing tax distortions. Second, we
show that the effect of a single country’s attempt to undertake a strategic policy to limit impacts on its domestic
energy-intensive industries has mixed effects. Exempting energy-intensive industries from the reduction program
is a costly solution to maintain the international competitiveness of these industries; a tax-cum-subsidy approach
is shown to be better than exemption policy to sustain exports. The welfare impact either policy—exemption or
subsidy—on other European countries is likely to be small because of general equilibrium effects.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many analyses of the impact of carbon emissions reduction policies impose a uniform carbon
tax or an economy-wide cap and trade system. There are, however, few if any examples in
environmental policy where such an ideal economic instrument has actually been implemented.
And importantly, real world economies are not as idealized as often assumed or represented in
economic models. In this paper, we focus on the economies of the European Union (EU) and
consider the economic implications when, for one reason or another, policies designed to limit
carbon diverge from the “idealized” policies usually represented in economic models.
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2An important part of our story is that the energy markets of the European Community are
already heavily distorted by energy taxes that vary widely across fuels, sectors, and countries.
In such a circumstance, one can do better than the “first-best” policies. Preexisting tax distortions
produce a “tax-interaction effect” that increases the costs of environmental taxes (see Bovenberg
and Mooij, 1994; Parry, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997).
We use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy (EPPA-EU),
including a breakdown of the European Union into 9 countries, and 1 region representing the
Rest of the EU (ROE), to address questions of second-best policies in a second best world. The
data set we use, GTAP 4-E, includes distortionary energy taxes and we are thus able to consider
how this divergence from idealized markets affects the estimates of the economic cost of the
various policies we evaluate. We have augmented the GTAP 4 data with prerelease data from
GTAP 5 to disaggregate the EU into its member states and we use Eurostat data to disaggregate
transportation from the basic GTAP social accounting matrices. This disaggregation allows us to
study interactions among EU countries and to focus on sectoral differences.
We focus here on carbon policies implemented domestically in each of the EU countries, i.e.
without emissions permit trading among EU members or with other countries outside the EU.
We take the EU burden sharing agreement that differentially allocated the EU-wide reduction of
8 percent below 1990 among member states as the basis for determining reductions. As shown
elsewhere (Viguier et al., 2001), there are widely varying economic impacts of the burden
sharing agreement among States.
We then consider three reasons why EU Member States might institute policies that diverge
from the ideal domestic economy-wide cap and trade system and consider the economic
implications of them doing so. First, while there is growing interest in emissions permit trading
within the EU, there is no experience with such a system for carbon or for other pollutants. Many
EU Member States have thus considered sector targets, where different measures might be used
to achieve each sector’s target. Member States might, for example, experiment with cap and trade
systems in electric utilities or energy intensive industries but use more traditional tax measures in
the household or transportation sectors. Here we find that the allocation of permits to sectors is
critical in determining the overall economic cost but, because of existing energy taxes, it is
possible to “do better” than the implied allocation from an economy-wide cap and trade system.
Second, countries often are concerned about international competitiveness. Competitiveness is
not a well-defined term in economics and has a variety of meanings among non-economists. In
economics the focus in international trade theory is on comparative advantage, recognizing that
an economy should specialize more in producing goods it is comparatively better at, whether or
not it has an absolute advantage over its trading partners. Implementing an ideal carbon policy
will shift advantage from carbon-intensive industries toward less carbon intensive industries
compared with trading partners that do not implement such a carbon policy. Allowing this shift
to occur, at least under standard assumptions of a small country, homogeneous goods, and non-
3distorted markets will reduce the cost of achieving the carbon policy within the country taking
the actions. The decline in carbon-intensive industry exports is, however, often seen as a loss in
competitiveness, with countries implementing policies to protect those industries most affected.
Exempting the sector from a constraint is expected to increase the cost of the policy (in the
general case see, for example, Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963; Dixit and Kyle, 1985; Krugman,
1996, and for climate policy, see, for example, Bohringer and Rutherford, 1997; Jensen, 1998;
Babiker et al., 2000a; Bernard and Vielle, 2001). With regard to protecting an industry’s exports
from the effects of the policy, this literature also finds generally that a “tax-cum-subsidy” policy
is better than an exemption policy in terms of economy-wide welfare losses.
The export industries whose trade competitiveness will be most affected by a carbon policy
are energy-intensive industries. In the EPPA model we use, these are aggregated as a single
sector. We consider the cost to the overall economy and the implications for energy intensive
industry of either exempting it from the carbon constraint or, instead, of constraining emissions
in the sector but subsidizing output equal to the amount of the carbon permit costs to the sector.
Third, we consider the possibilities for a single EU country—we use France as an example—
to strategically design its climate policies to gain a competitive advantage for its energy intensive
industries. Within the EU there has been considerable attention on harmonization of climate (and
other) policies because of concerns about unfair competition and industry relocation if Member
States were to pursue independent policies (see, for example EC, 2000). European and broader
international debates give voice to fears that climate change policies could alter industry-location
choices and that States will enter a “race to the bottom”—that is, a country might lower its
environmental standards to further its competitiveness in international trade (see, for example,
Barrett, 1994). Our investigation assumes that France meets its overall emissions target but either
exempts its energy intensive industry from carbon policies or subsidizes it at a level equal to the
direct cost of the carbon permit purchases by the sector. Our interest in this case is to consider
whether harmonization of the details of a climate policy has significant effects across the EU.
Here, our general finding is that harmonization at the detail of how a given cap is met does not
have much affect on other countries.
We begin in Section 2 by a brief presentation of the policy background of GHG emissions
reductions in Europe. Section 3 presents the basic model structure and the model specifications
(model default parameters). Section 4 describes the policy scenarios and reports the
computational results. Finally, in Section 5 we draw some conclusion from our findings.
2. POLICY BACKGROUND
At the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Annex B1 Parties committed to reducing, either individually or
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4jointly, their total emissions of six greenhouse gases
(GHGs) by at least 5 percent within the period 2008 to
2012, relative to these gases’ 1990 levels.
The European Union (EU) is a full Party to the UNFCCC
and a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol, and has accepted a
quantitative absolute reduction of 8 percent of its GHG
emissions. Article 4 of the Protocol allows the EU to
allocate its target among the Member States. A political
agreement on that redistribution was reached at the
environmental Council meeting in June 1998, and is
referred to as the “Burden Sharing” Agreement (BSA).
Table 1 shows the BSA adopted at the environmental
Council meeting by Member States on June 1998. The
sharing scheme specifies emissions targets for each member
country with the objective to reflect opportunities and constraints that vary from one country to
another, and to share “equitably” the economic burden of climate protection.
The Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B Parties to meet their commitments by three “flexible
mechanisms” (emission trading, clean development mechanism, and Joint Implementation) in
order to reduce the economic cost of emissions reductions. Flexible mechanisms could be
implemented at the domestic level in the first place.
3. THE MODEL
The Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model is a recursive dynamic multi-
regional general equilibrium model of the world economy that has been developed for analysis
of climate change policy (see, for example, Babiker et al., 2000a,c,d; Ellerman and Wing, 2000;
Babiker and Eckaus, 2000; Babiker and Jacoby, 1999). Previous versions of the model have been
used extensively for this purpose (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997; Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Jacoby
and Sue Wing, 1999; Reilly et al., 1999). The current version of EPPA is built on a
comprehensive energy-economy data set (GTAP4-E2) that accommodates a consistent
representation of energy markets in physical units as well as detailed accounts of regional
production and bilateral trade flows. The base year for the model is 1995 and it is solved
recursively at 5-year intervals. A full documentation of EPPA is provided in Babiker et al.
(2001). In this paper, we use a new version of the model (EPPA-EU) including a breakdown
for the European Union. The reference case for Europe in EPPA-EU is presented, and compared
with other economic models, in Viguier et al. (2001).
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Table 1. Burden Sharing Agreement
for 2010
 Base 1990 = 100
Austria 87.0
Belgium 92.5
Germany 79.0
Denmark 79.0
Spain 115.0
Finland 100.0
France 100.0
United Kingdom 87.5
Greece 125.0
Ireland 113.0
Italy 93.5
Luxemburg 72.0
Netherlands 94.0
Portugal 127.0
Sweden 104.0
Total European Union 92.0
53.1 EU Disaggregation
EPPA-EU extended the current version of EPPA by bringing in a detailed breakdown of the
EU and incorporating an industry and a household transport sectors for each region. The regional,
sectoral, and factors aggregation shown in Table 2, together with the substitution elasticities in
Table 3 completely specify the benchmark equilibrium.
The European Union is disaggregated into 9 countries and 1 region representing the Rest of
Europe (ROE). Four out of the 9 EU countries (France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands) were
aggregated together with ROE in the GTAP4-E database. We disaggregated this region using
data from the GTAP-5 Pre-release that provides a complete disaggregation of the EU.3 To
accomplish this task we developed an optimization algorithm that uses the economic structure of
these 4 countries in GTAP-5 Pre-release while imposing the output, demand, and trade balances
for their corresponding aggregate region in GTAP4-E. This allowed us to leave unchanged all
other regions of the standard EPPA based on GTAP4-E.
Table 2. Dimensions of the EPPA-EU Model
Production Sectors Name Countries and Regions Name
Non-Energy Annex B
1. Agriculture AGRI United States USA
2. Energy-Intensive Industries EINT Japan JPN
3. Other Industries and Services OIND Europe EEC
4. Transportation TRAN Denmark DNK
Energy Finland FIN
5. Crude Oil OIL France FR
6. Natural Gas GAS Germany DEU
7. Refined Oil REFOIL Italy ITA
8. Coal COAL Netherlands NLD
9. Electricity ELEC Spain ESP
Future Energy Supply Sweden SWE
10. Carbon Liquids United Kingdom GBR
11. Carbon-Free Electric Rest of EUa ROE
Other OECD OOE
Households (Consumers) Sector H Former Soviet Union FSU
Central European Associates EET
Primary Factors Non-Annex B
1. Labor L Brazil BRA
2. Capital K China CHN
3. Fixed Factors for Fuel and Agriculture India IND
Energy Exporting Countries EEX
Dynamic Asian Economies DAE
Rest of World ROW
a Includes Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, and Portugal.
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6Table 3. Model Parameters
Parameter Description Value
σERVA Elasticity of substitution between energy resource composite & value-added (agriculture only) 0.6
σER Substitution between land and energy-material bundle (agriculture only) 0.6
σAE Substitution between energy and material composite (agriculture only) 0.3
σVA Substitution between labor & capital
a 1
σENOE Substitution between electric and non electric energy 0.5
σEN Substitution among non-electric energy
b 1
σGR Substitution between fixed factor and the rest of inputs 0.6
σEVA Substitution between energy and value added composite
c 0.4
σDM Armington substitution between domestic and imports
d 3
σMM Armington substitution across imports:  Non energy goods:
 Energy goods:e
5.0
4.0
σCS Temporal substitution between consumption and saving 1
σC Substitution across consumption goods
f
G0 Labor supply annual growth rate in efficiency units: Developed countries:
Developing countries:
1-3%
2.5-6%
a Except nuclear in which it is 0.5.
b Except for electricity where coal and oil generation substitute at 0.3 among themselves and at 1.0 with gas.
c Except energy intensive and other industry where it is 0.5.
d Except Electricity where it is 0.3.
e Except refined oil (6) and electricity (0.5).
f Varies across countries and is updated with income recursively to reflect income elasticities based on an econometrically
estimated equation. See Babiker et al. (2001) for details.
3.2 Transportation Sector Disaggregation
The other change in this version of the model is the disaggregation of the transportation
sector. With transportation disaggregated, there are now nine output sectors for each of the 22
regions in EPPA-EU, as shown in the left-hand column of Table 2. The EPPA model also
includes future or “backstop” sources of fuels and electricity, but they do not play a significant
role in this analysis which looks only out to 2010. Eight of the production sectors follow the
standard EPPA definitions. The GTAP database does not include a separate transportation sector
within industry, nor does it contain a separate category for private automobile services in the
household sector. We followed the methodology developed by Babiker et al. (2000a) for the
United States to break out transportation from EPPA’s OTHERIND sector and to create a
household supplied transportation sector (i.e. private automobiles) in the EU.
The basic approach for the TRANS sectors is to use GTAP’s trade and transport sector that
combines transport with trade margins in combination with data from Input-Output tables
produced by the European statistical office (Eurostat). These tables provide the data to
disaggregate trade margins from transportation for each European country. For the other regions
in the model, we used the US input-output coefficients from Babiker et al. (2000a). The TRANS
industry supplies transportation services (both passenger and freight) to other sectors and to
households.
7We have also made adjustments directly to the Household (H) sector to represent own-
supplied transportation services, primarily that provided by personal automobiles. Households
produce transportation services for their own consumption using inputs from the Other Industry
Products (OIND) and Refined Oil sectors. Consumption expenditure of private households
reported by Eurostat (1999) and energy statistics from the International Energy Agency (IEA,
1998a; IEA, 1998b; IEA, 2000) along with the coefficients reported in Babiker et al. (2000a)
were used to separate the household purchases that are part of household production of
transportation from other household purchases.
The new breakout yields a sector of own-supplied personal transportation (private
automobiles) separate from other household activities, and a separate transportation sector in
industry that supplies transport services to both industry (i.e., freight transportation and any
passenger transportation purchased by business) and households (purchased transportation
service, mainly passenger transportation services such as air and rail service). Services from
private automobiles involve inputs from OIND that include the automobile itself, repairs,
insurance, parking, and vehicle fuel from the REFOIL sector. The procedure involves allocating
OIND and REFOILS output between direct uses in the household.
4. SCENARIOS AND RESULTS
In our simulations, we suppose that each Annex B country implements the necessary policies
to meet their Kyoto commitment by 2010. In addition, the reallocation made by the BSA is
applied for European countries. We also assume that Annex B countries outside the EU bubble
meet their target only by domestic actions (without international flexibility). Finally, no
restriction is put on non-Annex B countries.
4.1 Sector Targets
To consider the impact of sector targets we examine 3 cases. As a comparison with the many
studies that have applied uniform economy-wide policies, we first consider a case with an
economy-wide cap and trade system (equivalently, a single economy-wide carbon tax). We place
the cap on top of the existing fuel taxes. We then compare this with two cases where targets are
assigned to sectors but trade is not allowed across sectors. The two comparison cases are based
on two different methods for allocating sector targets. In one case, we allocate the Member
State’s economy-wide target reduction from the EU BSA to each sector without differentiating
on the basis of expected growth in emissions or on the availability of reduction options for the
sector (labeled SBSA for Sector BSA). For the second allocation rule, we recognize that the EU
and Member States would likely attempt to differentiate among sectors based on an assessment
of expected growth and technical capability of sectors to reduce emissions. To mimic a process
that might be used to look ahead to create sector targets, we use a global partial equilibrium
model of the world energy system—the POLES model (see Criqui et al., 1996, 1999; Criqui and
8Viguier, 2000a,b), developed at IEPE (Institut d’Economie et de Politique de l’Energie-CNRS)
—to establish sector targets. This model has more technical detail on sectors than exists in the
EPPA model. We establish sector targets by meeting each EU Member States BSA target in
POLES such that the marginal abatement costs across domestic sectors are equalized. We then
apply this allocation of emissions rights (in percentage terms) to the EPPA model assuming no
emissions trading within Europe. To summarize, the cases we construct to investigate the
economic effects of establishing sector targets without trade or with limited trade are:
ETR: Economy-wide trading (without trade across countries) as a benchmark to compare
with many other studies that have assumed an economy-wide policy.
SBSA: Each sector in each Member State is assigned that Member State’s BSA allocation
without differentiating among sectors.
POLES: Each sector is assigned a target based on the POLES model. The target is the
percentage reduction when marginal abatement costs were equalized across sectors based
on the POLES projection.
Figure 1 shows the welfare losses from implementing the BSA in Europe under different
allocation schemes, expressed as percentage changes in the equivalent variation index for year
2010 (equivalent variation is a measure of welfare that shows by how much regional well-being,
roughly the level of consumption, changes as a result of a policy intervention). The
implementation of the BSA by uniform reductions across domestic sectors (SBSA) generates
welfare costs in the range of 1-9%. As shown in Viguier et al. (2001), the BSA imposes very
different emissions reduction rates from one Member State to another. Given to the EPPA-EU
reference case, the economic costs are highest in Denmark, Netherlands, and Finland.
Equalizing marginal abatement costs across economic sectors at the domestic level with a
domestic emissions trading (or taxation) scheme can greatly reduce the cost of the burden in all
EU countries. The gains from using economic instruments are high because marginal abatement
costs vary across sectors. In general, the greater reductions occur in electricity and energy-
intensive industries under the economy-wide trading case where marginal abatement costs are
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Figure 1. Welfare Effects of the Kyoto Protocol under Different Allocation Schemes
9relatively low compared to households, transportation and agriculture. This is particularly true in
the United Kingdom, Germany or Finland where the predominance of coal and other fossil fuels
provide plenty of abatement opportunities. The BSA targets for France, the United Kingdom,
and Germany combined with projected growth in emissions means costs are relatively lower for
these countries as compared with Denmark, Sweden or Netherlands where emissions growth is
projected to be more rapid.
Figure 1 shows that welfare losses can be reduced in some countries, compared to the ETR
case, when we apply the POLES allocation in EPPA. Indeed, simulations are made in a second-
best world with pre-existing distortions in the economies such as fuel taxes. Consequently, the
allocation scheme equalizing marginal abatement costs across domestic sectors in EPPA under
the ETR cases is not guaranteed to be the best allocation of emission rights. For example, other
allocations can be welfare improving if they give more permits to sectors with high pre-existing
energy taxes. This is the case with the allocation of permits based on the POLES model results
that tend to give more permits to households and transportation sectors where energy taxes are
high. As a result, some countries like Netherlands, Spain or the United Kingdom are better off
with the POLES allocation than under the ETR case because it gives more permits to Households
(including own-supplied transportation).
To illustrate this impact of pre-existing distortions, we run the EPPA-EU model under
different sectoral allocations in France and plot the results in Figure 2. The y-axis is the change
in welfare in equivalent variation for the economy as a whole. On the x-axis are the different
sectoral allocations of permits. The 0.00 point on the x-axis corresponds to the sector reductions
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Figure 2. Welfare Effects of Changing Sectoral Allocation in France (variation from the ETR case)
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projected by EPPA under the ETR case. Other points were calculated by reallocating permits to
(or away from) a sector (e.g., transportation) proportionally from (or to) all other sectors. If there
were no other preexisting distortions in the economy the allocation of permits in the ETR case
would generate the smallest welfare loss, i.e. the plotted curves would reach their maximum
value at the 0.00 point.
Figure 2 shows that the 0.71% reduction in welfare associated to the ETR scenario can be
reduced by reallocating permits toward the household sector. For example, a 10-15% increase
of emission rights for the highly distorted household sector would lower the welfare costs of
meeting the BSA commitment in France as compared with the ETR case where a cap and trade
system is placed on top of existing fuel taxes. At the opposite, a domestic policy that would
increase the burden on the households and the transportation sector, while reducing the constraint
on energy-intensive industries, would increase costs for the economy as a whole.
We also examine the impacts of fuel price distortions by running the same two scenarios but
assuming that fuel taxes are reduced by 50 percent (ETR_tax and POLES_tax). Figure 3 shows
that in this case the POLES allocation is welfare decreasing for all EU countries ex cept Italy
compared to the NTR case.4
This result is consistent with the findings of the literature on the interaction between
distortionary taxations and environmental policies (see, for example, Bovenberg and Mooij,
1994; Parry, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997). A carbon tax
interacts with existing taxation and functions effectively as an increase in existing fuel taxes. A
first-best solution is to remove the preexisting distortions although removing fuel taxes, a major
source of government revenue in Europe, may not be politically feasible. “Over-allocating”
permits to the heavily taxed sector and disallowing trade, the basis by which we constructed
Figure 2, can be an improvement over a cap and trade system if distortionary taxes are not
removed. Such a remedy requires, however, accurate projections of sector emissions and
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Figure 3. Kyoto and Welfare: The Implication of Pre-Existing Distortions in Europe
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allocation; this is the case for Italy.
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reduction possibilities because, as is evident from Figure 2, the wrong reallocation can increase
costs substantially. A preferred scheme might be to place a carbon tax on emissions but provide
allow credit against the tax for existing fuel taxes based on the carbon content of the fuels. Once
the carbon taxes were sufficiently high so that all fuel tax payments could be credited, such a
system would essentially equalize marginal carbon taxes across fuels without loss of revenue.
4.2 Protecting Competitiveness of Energy Intensive Industries
In this section, we consider two cases to study strategies that might limit the impact of a
carbon constraint on exports of the energy intensive sector. We consider the energy intensive
sector because it is one of the most carbon-intensive sectors whose products are traded in
international markets. Transportation and electric utilities are energy-intensive but face limited
international competition outside of the EU. Similarly households do not produce traded goods.
Agriculture and other industry are less energy intensive and therefore not as seriously
disadvantaged by the carbon control as the energy-intensive industry. The cases we examine are:
EXEMP: Energy-intensive sector is exempted from the climate policy but other sectors must
reduce further so that each Member States achieves its target under the BSA.
SUBS: The energy-intensive sector is subsidized in each Member State at a level equal to the
amount of carbon tax it pays. In all other ways, the scenario is identical to the ETR case,
with economy-wide trading among sectors but not across countries. The compensative tax
rebate makes up the difference between prices of energy-intensive goods and actual cost of
production. Of course, prices of energy-intensive goods will differ from the business-as-
usual case because of relative prices changes in the production inputs from other sectors,
for example electric power, that face a carbon constraint.
We compare these cases to the reference ETR policy case.
Exempting energy-intensive industries from the cap program imposes an additional burden on
the European economy of over 1 percent welfare loss for some countries, although the increased
cost varies among countries (Figure 4). The European energy-intensive industries clearly benefit
from exemptions (Table 4), but this policy shifts the burden of emission reduction to other
sectors. As a result, output levels are significantly reduced in other sectors such as agriculture
and other industries in many EU countries.5 This additional cost placed on other sectors by the
exemption is higher than the gains of energy-intensive industries activities.
Figure 4 shows that a tax-cum-subsidy policy is Pareto-superior to an exemption policy.
The welfare cost of subsidizing energy-intensive industries is very low for most of Member
States compared to the exemption case. However, the subsidy policy is not exactly equivalent to
the business-as-usual scenario for the subsidized sectors because of relative prices changes due
to the carbon constraint. Energy-intensive industries benefit from this policy whereas the excess
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Table 4. Output Levels in Selected Sectors (% change)
ETR EXEMP SUBS
EINT OIND AGRI EINT OIND AGRI EINT OIND AGRI
GBR 3.01 -0.09 1.36 3.38 -0.05 1.91 3.64 -0.13 1.30
DEU -0.16 -0.50 0.76 0.07 -0.45 1.05 0.20 -0.53 0.63
DNK -0.51 -0.66 -2.62 0.52 -0.70 -2.75 0.20 -0.70 -2.75
SWE -2.01 -0.97 -0.39 2.10 -1.44 -0.02 -1.04 -1.11 -0.38
FIN -5.56 -0.13 -0.87 -3.59 -0.53 -1.16 -4.15 -0.37 -0.95
FRA -2.19 -0.34 -1.84 0.10 -0.42 -1.85 -1.33 -0.40 -1.72
ITA -5.13 -1.01 -1.58 0.29 -1.95 -3.04 -2.85 -1.27 -1.93
NLD -10.23 -0.54 4.69 -1.40 -0.90 2.60 -4.58 -0.82 4.45
ESP -8.31 -0.36 -5.29 -3.98 -0.61 -6.71 -6.11 -0.52 -5.45
REU -6.87 -0.19 5.39 0.43 -0.72 1.84 -1.88 -0.47 5.23
burden imposed on other economic sectors is limited.6 The reason for the less adverse effects of
the subsidy case is fairly straightforward. Imposing the tax on the energy-intensive industry
provides incentives for the industry to substitute away from fuels on the basis of their carbon
price whereas there is no economic incentive in the exemption case for these industries to
substitute. The remaining distortion from the subsidy is that it encourages sector output, and
hence energy use, to be higher than under the ETR case. Based on these results, this output effect
is relatively small.
Some caution in interpretation is in order here, however, because of the aggregation of all of
energy intensive industry as a single sector, an artifact of our modeling approach. More
realistically one might expect the caps and subsidies to be applied industry-by-industry or firm-
by-firm. By aggregating across energy-intensive industries and all firms, we implicitly assume
some product shift from the most energy-intensive industries to the relatively less so among
those in this aggregated sector. One might also expect a shift in output toward those firms that
                                                 
6
 In the case of the UK and Germany, OIND and AGRI are worse off because their loose the comparative advantage
that was created by the exemption policy.
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are most efficient. Firm-by-firm output subsidies would likely create more distortions than the
industry-wide subsidy modeled here. We generally expect the subsidy case to be less costly than
the exemption case but because of aggregation the additional costs are likely to be an
underestimate of the true cost of these approaches to limiting competitiveness effects.
To conclude, an exemption policy is a costly option to favor economic sectors opened to
international competition. Exemption introduces new distortions in the allocation of productive
factors and in consumption involving welfare losses. Our analysis verifies standard results from
economic literature: a “tax-cum-subsidy” policy is superior to an exemption policy to sustain
exports by limiting welfare losses (see, for example, Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963; Dixit and
Kyle, 1985; Krugman, 1996).
4.3 Impacts of Strategic Policies
The final set of cases we examine consider the possibility that a single country within the EU
might seek to gain a strategic trade advantage compared with other EU countries by exempting
or subsidizing its energy intensive sector while other EU Member States pursue a harmonized
policy of cap and trade. The broader issue here is whether harmonization of all the details of
climate policy is essential within the EU or whether individual countries might deviate from a
common policy. Our assumption is that if the deviation of a State from a common policy has
large effects across the EU then it will be more likely that Member States will demand
harmonization; on the other hand, if the effects are minor then less attention need be paid to each
country implementation details. We choose one of the larger EU States, France, and consider
policies in the energy intensive sectors where the trade effects are likely to be the greatest.
We assume, however, that France complies with the overall target set for it in the EU BSA.
The specific cases, identical to EXEMP and SUBS cases above except that the special treatment
of energy intensive industry is unilaterally pursued by France, are:
FR_ex: France unilaterally exempts its energy-intensive industries from any cap on carbon
emissions. We run this scenario without international emissions trading assuming that the
other EU countries meet their target by an economy-wide tax (or cap and trade) system.
FR_sub: France subsidizes its energy-intensive industries by a “tax-cum-subsidy” policy
whereas other Member States meet their target by an economy-wide tax (or cap and trade)
system.
Figure 5 computes the welfare impacts of strategic behavior in France. Exempting energy-
intensive industries from the cap program in France when other Member States apply an
economy-wide system causes an additional cost on the French economy. The exempted
industries are favored by the exemption, but output and exports are reduced in other sectors due
to the extra cost on them entailed by this policy (see Table 5). The closure rules in the foreign
accounts of the EPPA model essentially dictate that improved exports in one sector will be met
with reduced production and exports in another sector. In particular, the capital flows are
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Figure 5. Welfare Effects of Strategic Policies in France
Table 5. Output and exports in France (% change)
OUTPUT EXPORTS
ETR FR_ex FR_sub ETR FR_ex FR_sub
AGRI -1.84 -2.38 -1.89 -5.40 -7.90 -5.73
COAL -26.83 -26.02 -27.64 -29.27 -31.71 -31.71
OIL -14.26 -14.57 -14.47 – – –
GAS -11.82 -12.38 -12.07 -1.59 -1.98 -1.98
REFOIL -10.83 -11.11 -10.94 -6.13 -6.56 -6.46
ELEC -7.78 -9.28 -7.69 – – –
TRN -1.56 -1.70 -1.48 – – –
EINT -2.19 1.95 -0.36 -3.10 4.36 0.21
OIND -0.34 -0.55 -0.48 -2.10 -4.04 -3.03
TOTAL -0.77 -0.57 -0.69 -2.54 -1.97 -2.31
exogenously set in EPPA (and gradually decline to zero). The net goods trade flows must exactly
balance the capital flows for the international accounts to balance. In reality, a country might in
the short-run decrease (or increase) its foreign debt as a result of a carbon policy and thus could
increase (or decrease) it total exports of goods. Such a change in foreign debt would depend on
the countries monetary policy. EPPA models the real economy (it does not include financial
markets or monetary policy). The closure rule of exogenous capital flows reflects the assumption
that a country cannot run up an indefinitely large foreign debt, nor would a country accumulate
an indefinitely large foreign surplus.
Again, our analysis shows that a tax-cum-subsidy policy is a better way to sustain domestic
exporting industries than an exemption policy. Figure 5 shows that welfare costs of subsidizing
energy-intensive industries are lower for France compared to the exemption case. The positive
effect of this strategic policy on energy-intensive industries is more limited than with exemption,
but the adverse affects on other sectors are much more reduced. As a result, the net adverse
effect of the subsidy policy on the French economy is lower compared to the exemption policy.
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Table 6. Output Levels in Selected Sectors (% change)
ETR FR_ex FR_sub
EINT OIND AGRI EINT OIND AGRI EINT OIND AGRI
GBR 3.01 -0.09 1.36 2.56 -0.05 1.45 2.81 -0.07 1.38
DEU -0.16 -0.50 0.76 -0.56 -0.46 0.83 -0.34 -0.48 0.77
DNK -0.51 -0.66 -2.62 -1.05 -0.63 -2.56 -0.75 -0.64 -2.61
SWE -2.01 -0.97 -0.39 -2.44 -0.90 -0.41 -2.20 -0.94 -0.41
FIN -5.56 -0.13 -0.87 -5.88 -0.07 -0.86 -5.70 -0.10 -0.87
FRA -2.19 -0.34 -1.84 1.95 -0.55 -2.38 -0.36 -0.48 -1.89
ITA -5.13 -1.01 -1.58 -5.31 -0.99 -1.53 -5.21 -1.00 -1.57
NLD -10.23 -0.54 4.69 -10.54 -0.53 4.78 -10.37 -0.53 4.72
ESP -8.31 -0.36 -5.29 -8.49 -0.35 -5.24 -8.39 -0.36 -5.28
REU -6.87 -0.19 5.39 -7.52 -0.16 5.43 -7.17 -0.18 5.40
Finally, Figure 5 and Table 6 show that the impact of unilateral exemptions on other EU
countries is negligible. Indeed, the adverse effect of exemption on Member States’ energy-
intensive industries is compensated by an increase of output and exports of other industries.
There are substantial differential effects among countries of the BSA targets. Thus, the extent to
which differentiation under a burden sharing agreement is “fair” can result in different economic
burdens across countries. Our results indicate that the detailed implementation of carbon policies
in one country does not substantially affect other countries within the EU (see Viguier, 2000).
The lack of harmonization of the details of a climate policy need not be a significant concern in
the EU because the broader economic effects on other countries are small.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we have considered alternative climate change policy options for the European
Union with an emphasis on welfare, international trade, and sectoral effects of alternative
schemes to allocate emissions rights. We have also analyzed the economic impacts of strategic
behaviors by one Member State. We used the EU Burden Sharing Agreement as a basis for
establishing reduction levels required for each member state. We found, as others have, that the
welfare losses associated to the BSA implementation greatly vary from one Member State to
another. If the BSA reduction targets are uniformly extended to sectors without emissions trading
across sectors—that is if the same percentage of emissions reduction is applied in every sector
without marginal abatement costs equalization—the costs of climate policy increase to all EU
countries and the differences among countries widen. The major focus of this paper has been on
(1) the economic implications of choosing sectoral targets and forcing sectors to achieve these
reductions without trading across sectors, (2) policies that might limit impacts on exports of the
energy intensive sectors, and (3) the economic effects of a Member State pursuing a carbon
policy that differed in details from that of the rest of the EU, perhaps aimed at gaining a strategic
advantage in a key export industry. Our main conclusions are:
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• The gains from tradable permits (or uniform carbon taxes) at the domestic level can be
rather large because abatement costs depend crucially on the allocation of permits and
comparative growth in the sectors.
• A striking effect in terms of sector allocation is the effects of pre-existing energy taxes.
Allocations of permits that differ from the trading solution of the CGE model we used,
lowered economic costs in terms of welfare. The broader lesson here is that “ideal”
policies imposed in a second-best world where significant market distortions exist can
be easily improved upon. The first-best policy is to remove the pre-existing distortions.
High energy taxes in the EU, disproportionately levied on some fuels and some sectors,
are responsible for this effect. Considering these existing taxes when allocating permits or
somehow crediting fuel taxes paid in terms of their carbon equivalent would reduce the
costs of a climate policy in most EU States as compared with new carbon permit trading
scheme introduced on top of fuel taxes.
• Exempting energy-intensive industries from the carbon policy is costly for the European
economy as a whole. The comparison of an exemption policy with a “tax-cum-subsidy”
policy revealed that the second of these options is much less costly for the economy.
• If a Member States attempt to strategize on climate policies, and distort international
competition via subsidies or exemptions, the economic impacts of this type of behavior
on other European countries is small for the policies we examine because of general
equilibrium effects. Yet, the cost of such policies for the country undertaking them can
be substantial.
Many economic analyses estimate the costs of climate policies assuming idealized policies
applied in economies without pre-existing distortions. Neither of these assumptions is realistic.
Countries may seek to pursue sector-specific policies or otherwise attempt to protect some
industries such as major export industries that might be disproportionately affected by higher
energy costs. Further, European energy markets are highly distorted by the existence of high fuel
taxes that vary by sector and fuel. Our general findings are that diverging from ideal policies can
increase costs, but possible to do better than an “ideal policy” where there are obvious and
substantial pre-existing distortions.
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